25X1		13 August 1954	$\in \mathcal{D}$
	·	Copy No. 39	25X ⁻
	·		
·	CURRENT INTELL	IGENCE BULLETIN	
	DOCUMENT NO	8 S C	25X1
			25X
	Office of Curr	ent Intelligence	
	CENTRAL INTEL	LIGENCE AGENCY	25

Month of the sease 2004 87 108 EGRATET 79 TO 1975

. -	25X1A Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A201700510001-6
	SUMMARY
	GENERAL
1.	Comment on appointment of Soviet ambassador to Viet Minh (page 3).
	SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.	Skirmishes between Chinese Communist and Viet Minh units reported (page 5).
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. 7.	Comment on European offers of substantial credits to Iran (page 7). Cyprus Nationalist leader accepts Communist support (page 8).
	EASTERN EUROPE
8.	Hungarians demonstrate contempt for Soviet sportsmen (page 9).
	WESTERN EUROPE
9.	Churchill increasingly obsessed with desire to meet Soviet leaders (page 9).
	LATIN AMERICA
10.	Castillo Armas supporters in Guatemala reported growing 'disillusioned' (page 10).
11.	Army pressure for ousting Brazilian president seen easing (page 11).

25X1

25X1A

13 Aug 54 pproved For Release 25 d North Light For Publish 100 N 005 1000 1 Rage 2

25X1A

25X1

GENERAL

L.	Comment on appointment of Soviet ambassador to Viet Minh:
	The appointment of a Soviet ambassador, Alexander Lavrishchev, to the Viet Minh

25X1A

25X1

Alexander Lavrishchev, to the Viet Minh is a move to enhance the prestige and international status of the Ho Chi Minh regime.

Lavrischev's appointment, before a diplomat from Peiping is accredited to the Viet Minh, would also indicate that with a truce achieved Moscow is now moving to assert openly its primacy with the Viet Minh. In 1950, the USSR followed Communist China in recognizing the Ho Chi Minh government. The Viet Minh has had diplomatic representation in Peiping since 1951 and in Moscow since 1952.

25X1

_	_	_		1,00. 7 1 1 1	menter,	a spc	Claffet III I	oainaii ai	lairs,
ha	s been	ambassac	dor to	Turkey	since 19	948.	cialist in E		

13 Aug 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 3

	25X1AApproved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001700510001-6	4
	SOUTHEAST ASIA	
3.		
25X1A	an engagement has taken place be-	
1	tween Chinese Communist troops and two Viet Minh battalions near Lang Son, just south of the China border.	
25X1	, , ,	
	refugees from the	
	Moncay area, in extreme northeastern Tonkin, report Chinese Communist troops have occupied that area and "incidents" have occurred between them and Viet Minh units	
	25X1	
	a two-hour skirmish between a Chinese and a Viet Minh company in the southern part of the delta on 5 August was settled by local Viet Minh authorities.	
	·	

Approved For Pelease 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975 x 001700510001-6

Comment: Despite occasional rumors of the entrance of Chinese troops into the Viet Minh area, it has not been established that Chinese military other than advisers and technicians have crossed the border. Accounts of any incidents involving Chinese attached to Viet Minh units could be expected to be considerably exaggerated as word of them was passed on.

The Vietnamese population has a basic and longstanding distrust of the Chinese that was reinforced by the Chinese Nationalist occupation of Tonkin immediately after the war.

25X1

13 Aug 54

•	25X1A				
Ар	proved For Rel	ea se 2004/07/	08 : CIA-RDP7	9T009 75 A0 0170	0510001-6
25X1					

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Comment on European offers of substantial credits to Iran:

25X1A

Recent offers of substantial credits to Iran from Western European countries foreshadow a gradual easing of Tehran's foreign exchange difficulties in the next year. German, French and British concerns are already seeking to re-establish their Iranian markets, and an increase in international commercial competition may result as assured oil revenues improve Iran's credit.

13 Aug 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 7

25X1A		
Approved For Rel	ease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00	0975A001700510001-6

West German firms recently offered Iran a total of \$100,000,000 in credits for industrial expansion; French companies have extended sizable credits for the same purpose; and Britain is considering a \$14,000,000-loan for the purchase of British products. In addition, French and British firms have recently granted generous credit terms for railroad equipment. American firms have been reluctant to invest in Iran and to trade on the same credit terms as their European competitors.

Commercial credits, however, cannot solve Iran's budgetary problems. According to Ambassador Henderson, Iran needs an additional \$22,000,000 in American grant aid in 1954 for its domestic requirements. Without additional dollar grants or loans for the purchase of American merchandise, American trade is unlikely to maintain its present high position in Iran.

25X1A

7. Cyprus Nationalist leader accepts Communist support:

25X1A

Archbishop Makarios, leader of the Cypriot movement for union with Greece, has accepted an offer of Communist support and has recently conferred with local Communist leaders in Cyprus, according to the American consul.

Makarios says that recent British actions-presumably London's statement barring any change in the colony's
sovereignty and the announcement of rigid enforcement of the antisedition law--made rejection of the Communist offer impossible.

Reports from Athens and Nicosia indicate that the 12 August strike called by Cypriot Nationalist and Communist leaders has virtually paralyzed the island.

Comment: Communists control most of the labor force in Cyprus and can cripple most economic activity. The formation of a united front of Nationalists and Communists increases the British problem of preventing disorders.

Page 8

13 Aug 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

~	25X1A					
•	Approved For Role	ease 200	4/07/08 : CIA-RDP	79T00	l 97 5∧801700510 0	01-6
			EASTERN EUF	ROPE		
8.	Hungarians dem	onstrat	e contempt for	Sovi	et sportsmen:	
25X1A			that the Inte Games last their intende	rnation week ed pro	gation in Buda onal Universit not only failed opaganda funct	y Summer I to fulfill ion, but
	even produced s regime.	ome en	nbarrassing po	olitica	11 repercuss10	ns for the
	of Soviet sports loudly applaudin		receiving thei	r ent:		ence, and
	public has also and a slackening		ident from a h	igh r		•
	may reflect the regime has receive Hungarian sestimated 15,00 headquarters, a grievances.	ently place occer to 0 Budar	rian population' aced on nationate eam by the We pest residents	s res alism st Ge storn	ponse to the e . Following t rman team on ned the sports	he defeat of 4 July, an authorities'
Г	strate open host encouraged by t		the regime an	d its		probably been
L	25X1A			-	·	
			WESTERN EU	ROPE	E	•
9.	Churchill increa	asingly	obsessed with	desi	e to meet Sov	iet leaders:
25X1A	continued obses	sion wi	of the Britis further conf time, are g	sh cal erend reatly	rich reports the inet, most of ces with the US disturbed by the String with the S	whom oppose SSR at this Churchill's
13 A	Aug 54 CU	JRREN'	r intellige	NCE	BULLETIN	Page 9

Approved For Relea 25 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A001700510001-6

25X1A

25X1A		
Approved For Rel	ease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T0	0975A001700510001-6

On the basis of conversations with various cabinet members, Aldrich states that apparently Churchill has even threatened to form a coalition government with the Labor Party should his present colleagues fail to support him.

Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd states that the latest Soviet notes have played into the hands of those who oppose Churchill's desire, but that the danger of a "lonely pilgrimage" will recur should the Soviet leaders agree to meet Churchill outside the USSR.

Comment: The strength of Churchill's preoccupation is shown by his evident abandonment of the view that such
a meeting would have to be arranged in closest co-operation with the
United States. His almost total isolation on this question is reflected
in the suggestion that he might be willing to wreck the Conservative
government and precipitate a constitutional crisis.

Although Churchill has frequently proclaimed his desire for a meeting "at the summit," Soviet leaders have shown no willingness to meet him outside the USSR.

LATIN AMERICA

10	Castillo Armas supporter	s in Guatemala reported growing "disillusioned":
25X1A		Leaders of the Committee of Anti-Communist University Students threatened on 10 August to withdraw their group's support from junta
		president Castillo Armas,
		They claim that many known Communists still
٠ ـ	hold high public office.	

Castillo is still a public hero, but his followers reportedly are 'rapidly becoming disillusioned' because of his failure to satisfy them on the Communist question.

Comment: Although government efforts to apprehend top Communist leaders have thus far failed, the overt Communist organization has collapsed and no Communist or pro-Communist is known to be currently holding public office. Many of Castillo's

13 Aug 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 10

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001700510001-6

25X1

25X1A	
Approved For Pale	 \$ 2 0017005100

followers, however, were subject to severe persecution under the Arbenz regime, fought with the Army of Liberation, and now feel entitled to revenge and a place on the public payroll. Repudiation of Castillo by the Committee of Anti-Communist students could have an important effect on public opinion.

Castillo is also running into trouble on the labor front. On 11 August, the junta, in the name of anti-Communism, dissolved four major unions. The result was a storm of protest from anti-Communist labor elements and criticism of the junta for "selling out" to foreign capital.

	11.	Army pressure for ousting Brazilian president seen easing:
251/4		
25X1		

Meanwhile, the War Ministry announced on 12 August that all army generals on duty in the Rio de Janeiro area have reaffirmed their desire to investigate in an orderly fashion the circumstances surrounding the attempted assassination of a prominent antiadministration newspaper publisher. The statement added, however, that they will remain prepared for any eventuality.

Comment: Any indecisiveness in the ranks of the generals would increase Vargas' chances of weathering the current crisis which was set off by the attempted assassination. The final position of the military, however, will probably hinge to a large extent on the validity of current rumors that close relatives of the president were involved in the incident.

Even if Vargas survives this crisis, his party can be expected to suffer heavily in the October congressional elections—involving all seats in the lower house and two-thirds of the Senate. It is also likely that the military will keep a closer eye on his conduct of affairs.

13 Aug 54

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 11